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Until late, the subject of energy and its importance for capitalism and the 
constitution and reconstitution of world order has been sorely overlooked 
in the international political economy (IPE) literature. Indeed, only two of 
the major textbooks in IPE have chapters on energy (Di Muzio and Ovadia 
2016). This is also true of the literature known as classical political economy. 
With few exceptions, the main questions that animated the classics such as 
the origins of the wealth of nations and the distribution of wealth are some-
how disconnected from the production and consumption of energy. Marginal 
exceptions granted, there is little acknowledgement that the last three centu-
ries of uneven and combined “progress” and “development” have anything 
to do with the exploitation of coal, oil and natural gas. However, if recent 
scholarship is any indication, this appears to be changing both within IPE 
and within other academic fields such as geography, sociology and environ-
mental studies. In this emergent literature, we can find an argument that 
energy should not be treated as auxiliary to our analysis of the global politi-
cal economy but essential to understanding and interpreting its emergence, 
transformations and future trajectories (Di Muzio 2015). Since fossil fuels 
make up an overwhelming share of global energy production and consump-
tion (see Fig. 14.1) I will mainly concentrate of non-renewable fossil fuels and 
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aim to provide a critical political economy approach to energy, capitalism and 
world order by using the capital as power perspective.
This is certainly not the only approach that we could take, but it is the 
one I find most revealing and convincing. To make this argument, I have 
divided the article in the following way. First, I concisely survey why energy 
is important for our theorizations of the global political economy as well as 
for understanding the practices of everyday life. With this background infor-
mation in place, I briefly review how mainstream and critical accounts have 
approached the question of energy and the global political economy and dem-
onstrate how the capital as power approach is distinctive for its focus on capi-
talization and social reproduction. In the second section, I will consider the 
power of the oil and gas firms in shaping and reshaping social reproduction 
and how there are strong indicators to suggest that renewable forms of energy 
cannot presently—and likely never will—replace fossil fuels and perpetuate 
energy intensive modes of living centuries into the future. Moreover, because 
of the entrenched power of oil and gas firms and their connection with afflu-
ent social reproduction, transitioning to less carbon intensive modes of social 
reproduction are being stalled. I conclude the article by discussing the rela-
tionship between energy, violence and world order.
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 A Brief Excursus on Energy
Though often taken for granted in daily life, if we take energy seriously, the 
global political economy is at base a solar economy whereby humans have 
come to monetize energy and natural resources in hierarchical domestic and 
international relationships. Without the energy of the sun and the conver-
sion of radiant energy into chemical energy carried out by plants and algae 
through the process of photosynthesis, life on earth would be impossible. Oil, 
coal and natural gas—can be considered “buried sunshine”, or chemical stores 
of energy that, through heat and pressure over millennia, have accumulated 
in variegated reservoirs internationally (Crosby 2006). These fossil fuels are 
ultimately derived from the energy of the sun and are understood to be non- 
renewable on a human scale. But what is energy and what is at stake in taking 
it seriously? Natural scientists may debate the precise definition of “energy” 
but most would agree that it can be conceptualized as the capacity to do work 
(Smil 1994, 2006). What this suggests is that political economies with more 
energy have a greater potential to do work on the natural environment and 
transform their conditions of existence—albeit within a network of power 
relations and historical constraints and enablers. Indeed, countries that are 
considered “advanced economies” or “highly developed” political communi-
ties will show very high energy consumption figures while those considered 
as lesser or least developed countries will show very low energy consumption 
figures. Figure 14.2 charts the total primary energy consumption of three least 
developed countries recognized by the World Bank.
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All three countries are consuming very low amounts of energy and do not 
even approach one quadrillion British thermal units. This disparity in energy 
access and therefore productive ability becomes apparent when considering 
Fig. 14.3 which charts energy consumption from three internationally rec-
ognized “developed” countries. The difference in the orders of magnitude is 
unmistakable. Fig. 14.4 also contrasts the energy use per capita between the 
two groups of countries. Thus on an aggregate and per capita basis, devel-
oped countries simply consume in order of magnitude more energy than least 
developed countries.
What these charts strongly suggest is that one of the things at stake in tak-
ing energy seriously for critical IPE scholars is the recognition that radically 
uneven consumption and access to energy should be a key factor in explaining 
the persistence of poverty and “underdevelopment”. As the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) noted:
Energy services are a crucial input to the primary development challenge of pro-
viding adequate food, shelter, clothing, water, sanitation, medical care, school-
ing, and access to information. Thus energy is one dimension or determinant of 
poverty and development, but it is vital … lack of access to energy contributes 
to poverty and deprivation and can contribute to economic decline. (2000: 44)
But the connection between access to affordable energy and development 
is not the only thing at stake in taking energy seriously. Four additional 
concerns can be highlighted before we move on to discuss how mainstream 
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and critical scholarships have approached the global political economy of 
energy. First, for energy to be useful, it must be converted into another 
form. However, energy conversion is never a straightforward process as some 
energy is always lost in the transformation and not all energy can be con-
verted easily. Second, the ratio of energy returned on the energy invested or 
what is known as ERoEI, is a crucial indicator of how much energy needs to 
be consumed or invested in return for a specific amount of energy received. 
A declining ERoEI is worrisome in an energy dependent economy because 
it suggests that it is becoming more difficult and expensive for firms to har-
ness energy resources. Third, the global combustion of fossil fuels is the 
leading cause of global climate change and if companies and consumers con-
tinue to monetize and combust the world’s remaining stores, the climate 
future generations inherit will be radically changed. As the former head of 
NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, James Hansen and his col-
leagues warned “burning all fossil fuels would threaten the biological health 
and survival of humanity, making policies that rely substantially on adap-
tation inadequate” (James Hansen et  al. 2013: 25). In sum, the ongoing 
social reproduction of high-energy lifestyles is effectively destroying the bio-
sphere for future generations, the consequences of which will be experienced 
unevenly across the global population (Kempf 2008; Di Muzio 2015a). Last, 
from an evolutionary perspective, we could also make the argument that 
over time, certain human communities—for one reason or another—have 
become more proficient at capturing and converting energy for the social 
reproduction of energy intensive modes of living. But critical political econ-
omists cannot stop at this level of conceptualization and must understand 
the production and consumption of energy within the context of historical 
and shifting power relations.
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 Mainstream and Critical Approaches
In IR/IPE there are two mainstream approaches to energy: (neo)realist 
and neolilberal institutionalism and a variegated critical approach mainly 
informed by the Marxist tradition.1 All have something to offer the debates 
in IPE but the mainstream approaches are fairly narrow-minded and insuf-
ficiently critical while the Marxist approach has serious flaws insofar as it 
rests on the labour theory of value. Speaking broadly, most realists fetishize 
the state and conceive of it as though it was a unitary actor operating in an 
anarchical system. Because there is no world government to hold states in 
check, realists argue that statesmen and women must do their best to protect 
the nation’s security. Having access to fossil fuels—and energy more gener-
ally—in this framework is useful only insofar as it can help maximize the 
power and security of the state as a whole. In this state-centric approach there 
is very little analysis of who exactly benefits from war and fossil fuel depen-
dence or why energy consumption is so uneven. Most realists lump energy/
oil under ‘material capabilities’ (as do some critical scholars, e.g. Cox 1987) 
and assume that the amount or quality of these capabilities are linked with 
international power or the lack of it. However, because “material capabili-
ties” are never conceptually unpacked, access to fossil fuels is treated just like 
access to any other strategic commodity. Others are more explicit and focus 
on how international power is underwritten by access to fossil fuels (particu-
larly oil) and investigate how energy and international conflicts are related in 
past, present and the likely future (e.g. Colgan 2013a and b; Elhefnawy 2008; 
Friedrichs 2013; Klare 2002, 2004, 2009; Sprio 1999; Stoddard 2013; Stokes 
and Raphael 2010).
The approach of neoliberal institutionalism is generally concerned with 
how agents other than the state can help promote transnational cooperation 
and overcome international anarchy—largely by rules, institutions and mar-
ket mechanisms (Colgan et al. 2012; Goldthau and Witte 2013; Ikenberry 
1986; Keohane 1978; Keohane and Victor 2013). In general, most neolib-
eral institutionalists take capitalism for granted and demonstrate very little 
awareness of how the magnitude of capital accumulation and its greater 
 universalization is historically tethered to the exploitation of non-renewable 
fossil fuels. Indeed, the neoliberal institutionalist approach is far more inter-
ested in problem solving than it is in understanding how the present world 
order emerged. Moreover, the liberal tradition tends to have a progressive 
understanding of history that anticipates continued economic growth and 
1 A useful summary is found in (Hancock and Vivoda 2014).
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human betterment (Di Muzio 2011; Jahn 2013). This is despite the fact that 
there are very real physical limitations to perpetual economic growth (Fix 
2014).
From a critical point of view, Marxists fare much better than their main-
stream counterparts. Marx was certainly aware of humanity’s inseparable tie 
with nature. However, in his scientific account of capitalism, he treated labour 
as the sole source of value and relegated the major energy source of his time—
coal—to an “auxiliary” in production. From this point, energy remained a key 
blind spot for Marxism until the oil price shocks of the 1970s. The work of 
(Debeir et al. 1991) underscored the importance of energy for Marxist politi-
cal economy but their work was virtually ignored until late. With few excep-
tions (Bromley 1991; Nore and Turner 1980), it was not until the oil price 
spike of 2000, the “war on terror” and murmurs about peak oil that Marxist 
attention resurfaced on questions related to energy, political economy and 
international power and imperialism. I cannot do justice to the richness of 
these works here and they are certainly more critical and insightful than the 
mainstream approaches (e.g. Altvater 2007; Bromley 1991, 2005; Podobnik 
2006). However, with some nuance, what they all share in common is the 
view that capitalism is a mode of production and (implicitly or explicitly) that 
labour power is the sole source of value and that labour time can somehow 
explain prices and accumulation (the transformation problem). As I see it 
there are at least two problems with this position, (1) for the most part it is 
only concerned with production and therefore misses wider societal aspects of 
power and how they impact upon accumulation and; (2) it is far more likely 
that corporate power and control over production shapes prices and accumula-
tion rather than labour time values. For these reasons I use what is arguably 
the more critical approach of capital as power.
The capital as power approach differs in a number of important ways from 
the perspectives we have only briefly discussed (Nitzan and Bichler 2009; 
Di Muzio 2014). First, capitalism is conceived not as a mode of produc-
tion between workers and capitalists but as a mode of power between owners 
or capitalists and non-owners. The primary act of owners is the capitaliza-
tion of income-generating assets with the goal to accumulate more money 
at a faster pace than rivals attempting to do the same. The dominant actor 
is understood to be the corporation or firm and those with the highest levels 
of capitalization are theorized as “dominant capital” or those firms with the 
power to shape and reshape social reproduction more effectively than firms 
with smaller capitalization. Accumulation in this framework is measured by 
how much the value of an owner’s capitalization rises over time with the level 
of capitalization largely contingent on the earnings firms are able to generate. 
[AU8]
14 Energy, Capital as Power and World Order 273
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
From the point of view of the capital as power approach, earnings are not sim-
ply a matter of producing commodities for the market and the exploitation 
of workers. Earnings are a matter of a firm’s ability to exert material, cultural 
and ideological power of an entire social field and the more successful they 
are in doing so the greater their differential earnings will be relative to rival 
accumulators in the corporate universe. For this reason, capital is not theo-
rized as “capital goods” as in the neoclassical approach nor is it understood 
to be ‘dead labour’ as in the Marxist approach. Instead, capital is theorized as 
commodified differential power. What this means is that when investors or 
owners hold or purchase claims to income-generating assets, they are effec-
tively capitalizing the power of a corporation to shape and reshape the terrain 
of social reproduction. Briefly, social reproduction can be understood as the 
way in which any society produces, consumes and reproduces its lifestyles 
and livelihoods, how it understands them and how it justifies these practices 
both ideologically, legally and by an apparatus of force and punishment (e.g. 
military, prisons, detention camps). What this suggests is that the state or gov-
ernment apparatus can never be dislocated or disentangled from the process 
of accumulation. There are two main ways in which the state and capital are 
intimately connected. First, most governments in the world have a “national” 
debt that is owned by private capitalists and who receive interest payments on 
their securities from the tax and fine revenues generated by governments. In 
other words, the state or government apparatus is itself a capitalized entity. 
Second, the market for government debt or perhaps more simply, the bond 
market, is the heart of global finance because it provides a benchmark rate of 
return for capitalists to assess or evaluate their investment priorities. Insofar as 
interest rates remain positive, it provides owners with a guaranteed return on 
investment. For these reasons the capital as power approach does not theorize 
the state and market or the state and corporation as practically or ideologi-
cally separate. Instead, political and corporate power have always been fun-
damentally entangled, albeit in a variety of ways we cannot fully discuss in 
this brief chapter. But while all these points may be intelligible to readers, 
it remains for us to highlight how the capital as power perspective is a criti-
cal approach to political economy. First, the accumulation of money is not 
based on individual productivity or the contributions one makes to society 
but rooted in the institution of ownership and ownership largely originated in 
past  violence, access to political power and legal fiction. Second, private own-
ership of income-generating assets implies both exclusion and the sabotage 
or damage of society and human creativity. There are two types of sabotage: 
general and specific. General sabotage implies that all firms must engage in 
some degree of incapacitation in trying to accumulate differentially. Specific 
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sabotage is the way in which each individual firm strategically acts to disrupt 
or incapacitate production and the wider process of social creativity. Third, 
the capitalist mode of power follows the logic of differential accumulation, 
a logic that is based on increasing inequality and non-democratic forms for 
exclusion at the expense of pursuing a more humane logic that would have 
decent human livelihoods, the alleviation of gross inequalities, and the pro-
tection of the biosphere as its focus. In the next section, I apply the capital 
as power framework to the largest sector in the global economy by market 
capitalization.
 Capitalism and the Power of Oil and Gas Firms
If we conceive of the global political economy analytically, we could argue 
that it is made up of 37 sectors ranked by market value or capitalization.2 At 
first glance, it would appear that banks lead all the other sectors at US$4.5 
trillion in market capitalization. Intuitively, this would seem to make sense 
given the importance of money in a market economy and the way that money 
expands largely through commercial bank loans. However, this is illusory. By 
far the most capitalized industry on the planet is the oil and gas industry once 
the estimated market value of state owned oil and gas firms are considered. 
In 2005 McKinsey valued the state oil and gas firms as if they were pub-
licly traded companies and imputed (adjusted for inflation) a figure of about 
US$3.6 trillion. If we add this sum to the capitalization of oil and gas firms 
in the 2014 edition of the FT Global 500—a list of the largest companies in 
the world by market value—the total capitalization for the oil and gas sector 
would be US$6.7 trillion. As part of the unholy trinity of fossil fuels, if we 
added coal to the figure, we would witness a negligible increase since the total 
market value according to Stowe’s coal index is US$115 billion.3 But what 
does all this suggest? First, it suggests the absolute centrality of oil and gas 
to the formation and reformation of what I have previously called a global 
petro-market civilization (Di Muzio in Gill 2011; Di Muzio 2012, 2015b). 
I theorize this as an uneven and hierarchical civilizational order whose social 
reproduction of energy intensive living is largely contingent on affordable, 
accessible and abundant carbon energy. What this implies is that for a signifi-
cant portion of humanity, previous stores of solar energy are being monetized 
to promote high-energy lifestyles—or what Brand and Wissen (2013) refer 
2 The following draws on the Global FT 500.
3 http://stowe.snetglobalindexes.com/ (4/3/2015).
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to as an “imperial mode of living”. However, since we know that wealth and 
income are highly uneven both within and between nations, it also suggests 
that the small fraction of humanity with more income and wealth are also 
those responsible for greater environmental damage and the potential destruc-
tion of a habitable biosphere for future generations and non-human species. 
As Barry sombrely notes: “the scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate 
change has accumulated to the extent that we could be the first species to 
accurately document our own demise” (2012: 1). This is indeed a sobering 
thought given that the second reason why realizing that the oil and gas sec-
tor is the most heavily capitalized is important: the future. When investors 
purchase shares in corporations they are capitalizing the corporation based on 
expected future profit, not present performance. What this means is that the 
level of capitalization relative both to past capitalization of the firm and other 
firms in the corporate universe is a forward looking indicator for how inves-
tors think about the future. Rising capitalization relative to past capitalization 
as well as relative to rival accumulators suggests that investors see a bright 
future for meeting projected earnings targets. Now, it goes without saying that 
investors are often wrong about the future, but the danger of being incorrect 
does not stop them from trying to anticipate likely futures based on the infor-
mation they have to hand. Figure 14.5 plots the capitalization of all the major 
oil and gas firms listed on the FT Global 500.
Fig. 14.5 Oil and gas company capitalization vs WilderHill NEX, 2001–2014[AU10]
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Despite the dip during the global financial crisis in 2008–9, the trend is 
clear. The capitalization of the oil and gas firms increased by 182% from the 
beginning to the end of our period. Thus, if we created an equally weighted 
basket of oil and gas stocks on the FT Global 500 and paid US$1,000 to 
purchase our shares in 2001 at the start of our period, we would have earned 
US$1,820 by 2014. One can imagine the astronomical sums made by those 
who own millions of shares in oil and gas companies rather than our pal-
try example of having simply invested US$1,000. But Figure 14.5 suggests 
something even more important since it also plots the most comprehensive 
index for the renewable energy industry—the WilderHill New Energy Global 
Innovation Index or in brief NEX.4 Now there is little doubt that since at least 
the turn of the 21st century considerably more attention has been given to 
finding, funding and subsidizing renewable energy. This drive heightened as 
the price of oil skyrocketed over the period (see Fig. 14.6) leading to renewed 
and in some sense greater calls for energy independence and alternatives to 
fossil fuels.
4 “The WilderHill New Energy Global Innovation Index is comprised of companies worldwide whose 
innovative technologies and services focus on generation and use of cleaner energy, conservation and 
efficiency, and advancing renewable energy generally. Included are companies whose lower-carbon 
approaches are relevant to climate change, and whose technologies help reduce emissions relative to tra-
ditional fossil fuel use”.http://www.nexindex.com/ (3/24/2015).
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Institutionalizing this trend, a new intergovernmental body—the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)—came into force in 
2010 in Abu Dhabi. IRENA is headquartered in Masdar City, a multi-billion 
dollar arcology project in the process of building a planned city with sustain-
able elements, including the use of renewable energy and pedestrian friendly 
public transport networks. There are other positive signs that the newly emer-
gent renewable energy industry may eventually help substitute for, if not by 
some accounts, totally replace (over time) the consumption of oil and gas. For 
instance, the latest report from the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 
21st Century celebrated the fact that 144 countries had demonstrated some 
commitment to meeting renewable energy targets while 138 countries had 
policies in place to support the renewable energy industry (REN21 2014). 
While investments fluctuate yearly, the same report also notes that invest-
ment in the hundreds of billions of dollars continues to pour into renew-
able energy technologies. All considered, one might get the impression that 
global society is on the cusp of moving from a petro-market civilization to a 
post-carbon civilizational order fuelled by various forms of renewable, green 
and clean energy. The counter-evidence, however suggests otherwise. First, 
let us consider the capitalization of the renewable energy industry. At pres-
ent, there is not a single firm in the Global FT 500 and the capitalization of 
the industry is an order of magnitude—trillions, not billions—lower than 
the oil and gas industry. Since the only sector of the global political economy 
that could potentially rival or overtake the fossil fuel industry is the renew-
able energy industry, we ought to be concerned with how investors anticipate 
the differential earnings potential of renewable energy firms. The evidence 
in Figure 14.5 is sobering and suggests that investors are nowhere near bid-
ding up expectations. In fact, had investors capitalized the renewable energy 
index, their return on investment would have been −6% over the period. In 
other words, as an investor, you would have deaccumulated relative not only 
to the oil and gas industry (about a 7% return from 2007 to 2014) but also 
the broad S&P 500 index which returned 9.2% over the period. The general 
problem across the industry is that it is capital intensive and its earnings are 
either too low compared to the returns of other firms and sectors of the global 
economy or they are non-existent. As the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 
recent report on renewable energy states “the capital-intensive nature of proj-
ects can make the risk/return profile of such assets challenging for investors” 
(2014b: 8). At the moment the risk/return ratio appears to be very challenging 
since we know that investors are ultimately concerned with differential accu-
mulation. Though Marx mistakenly anchored his theory of accumulation in 
the labour theory of value, he did understand that, “use-values must therefore 
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never be looked upon as the real aim of the capitalist; neither must the profit 
on any single transaction. The restless never-ending process of profit-making 
alone is what he aims at” (1887: 105). In other words, what matters most to 
capitalists is the accumulation of money and the renewable energy industry is 
nowhere close to showing monumental returns that would warrant trillions 
in capitalization. To be sure, this could change, but there are even more signs 
that compound the obstacles for a thriving post-carbon order founded on 
renewable industry. First, for the foreseeable future there is important evi-
dence to suggest that current forms of high-energy social reproduction can-
not be sustained with known sources of renewable energy. At best, renewable 
energy may move from making up about 19% of global final energy con-
sumption to a little less than 30% of the world’s energy consumption in the 
21st century (Trainer 2007; Heinberg 2009; Smil 2011; REN21 2014: 13; 
Zehner 2012). Second, fossil fuel subsidies continue to be in the hundreds 
of billions of dollars yearly, dwarfing the investment made to the renewable 
energy industry by a factor of four (IEA 2014: 4). In 2013, the oil and gas 
industry received US$550 billion in subsidies while the renewable energy 
industry garnered a mere US$120 billion in global subsidies. What this sug-
gests is that—on the whole—governments continue to favour the oil and 
gas industry over renewable energy. To be sure, some governments are more 
actively involved in promoting greener and cleaner energy but at the moment, 
not a single nation in the G7, let alone the OECD consumes the majority of 
its power from non-renewable fuels. The IEA, the authoritative body set up 
to monitor world energy stocks and flows, anticipates that fossil fuels will 
continue to make up the majority of energy consumption in the rich world 
for most of this century. Even in Germany, where the political leadership has 
demonstrated a strong concern for energy conservation and renewable energy, 
we still find total final energy consumption consists of 83% fossil fuels with a 
goal to reduce this total only slightly by 2020 (IEA 2013: 119). If this is not 
enough to demonstrate the uphill challenges faced by the renewable energy 
industry and the fact that global society continues to be locked into an uneven 
and hierarchical carbon energy order, there is even more evidence to weigh 
when we think about the transition to a post-carbon energy future. Though 
I cannot go into detail here and note that this is not an exhaustive list, some 
of the main concerns to be found in the transition literature are as follows:
• Reliability as some sources are irregular (e.g. wind and tides)
• The potential for scalability (e.g. wind turbines and solar cells)
• The conversion of fertile land to wind farms and/or biofuels (e.g. the loss 
of food crops)
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• Negligible or negative energy returned on energy invested (e.g. some 
biofuels)
• Integration into pre-existing power infrastructure (e.g. electricity generated 
by wind)
• The inefficiency of battery storage (e.g. the loss of energy during 
conversion)
• The high price of renewable technologies (e.g. the price point of photovol-
taic solar cells)
• Components made with commercially exhaustible and costly rare Earth 
elements (e.g. gallium and indium used in solar cells)
• Low winter insolation, dust and water vapour and clouds (e.g. photovoltaic 
solar cells)
• Capital-intensive investment (e.g. wind turbines, solar cells, research and 
development) (adapted from Di Muzio 2015b drawing on Trainer 2007; 
Heinberg 2009; Smil 2011; Zehner 2012).
Thus, if we weigh the evidence, it would appear that the oil and gas com-
panies—publically and state owned—have the collective power to continue 
to shape and reshape the social reproduction of the world energy order going 
forward. Given our knowledge of the likely consequences of climate change, 
it may be appropriate to ask why this power is permitted to continue and why 
governments across the world do not simply mandate that fossil fuel resources 
remain in the ground to safeguard future generations. From the perspective 
of critical political economy, a potential answer is fourfold and only briefly 
elaborated on here. First, the dominant logic of business and governments is 
not livelihood or sustainability but differential capitalization and the pursuit 
of economic growth. Both require tremendous amounts of carbon energy to 
achieve. In the present environment, thinking about a leading politician run-
ning on an electoral platform of degrowing the economy is just as absurd as 
imagining a corporate CEO announcing that the firm she oversees will have 
the goal of accumulating fewer earnings this quarter than the last. Second, 
there is a certain degree of path dependence and what I will call here “path 
expectation”. In terms of fossil fuels, path dependence essentially means that 
the construction of a more global petro-market civilization leads to energy 
intensive modes of living and that these modes of living combined with 
the drive to accumulate social power in the form of money necessitate ever-
more carbon energy for growth. For example, every new suburb created is an 
 architectural testament to greater future energy intensity insofar as these eco-
systems are built around the single family dwelling and automobility. What I 
mean by path expectation is simply the idea that additional governments and 
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their citizens may find it highly desirable to embark upon a path towards high- 
energy intensive living as the Chinese, Indians and Brazilians have recently 
done. Indeed, not only have these three countries seen accelerated growth in 
the last 20 years, but also increased energy consumption, altering the world 
energy order (de Graaff 2012). Realizing these expectations in material form 
is now leading to greater carbon energy path dependence in more countries. 
For instance, as a collective, non-OECD countries are now the primary con-
sumers of total final energy consumption, a trend only recently broken (BP 
Statistical Review 2014). Third, the temptation to monetize the remaining 
economically exploitable fossil fuels on the planet may be too great. Most 
traders and investors envision a time when demand will finally outstrip supply 
and prices will skyrocket to unforeseen levels. If this happens, one can bet that 
both the earnings and capitalization of the oil and gas (and likely coal) firms 
will also skyrocket. A few stand to gain immense amounts of money by mon-
etizing the destruction of the world’s biosphere. Last, at the moment there are 
no large-scale energy alternatives and any post-carbon society is likely to have 
to form new social relations, new methods of production, logic and thought, 
new ways of governing and new indicators to govern social reproduction. It 
may be the case that it is simply easier to follow on the same ruinous course 
and hope that market forces will somehow sort out a reasonable future. Either 
way, this will be a Herculean task not made any easier the more societies and 
governments delay actively transitioning to a low carbon energy regime. There 
are certainly spaces of hope to point to but at the moment, they are largely 
marginal. A final consideration from the perspective of critical IPE is the rela-
tionship between carbon energy, violence and world order.
 Energy, Violence and World Order
Before the transition to settled agriculture and animal husbandry, most 
anthropologists argue that our hunting and gathering ancestors were rela-
tively egalitarian (Boehm 2001). This is not to project some utopia back into 
the ancient past but to recognize that with the rise of settled agriculture and 
cities, the social division of labour became more diversified and considerably 
more hierarchical, with a dominant caste typically appropriating social sur-
pluses where the first major civilizations arose. Coinciding with this transi-
tion was the eternal recurrence of slavery and other forms of labour servitude. 
Though forms of slavery and servitude certainly differed historically and geo-
graphically, what they all have in common is that a minority of very powerful 
people used their slaves and servants as human energy converters to support 
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their own affluent social reproduction. As late as 1772, the British agricultural 
writer Arthur Young (1741–1820) estimated that of a world population of 
775 million, only 33 million could be categorized as in any way “free”. The 
remainder, some 742 million existed in countless forms of servitude to the 
4.3% of the world’s population living as privileged dominators (Nikiforuk 
2012: 12). One of the most violent and devastating examples of this search 
for exploitable human energy was the centuries-long transatlantic slave trade 
with an estimated 12 million people forcibly removed from their ancestral 
homes in Africa and transported to the “New World” where they would work 
under brutal conditions for the differential accumulation of the plantocracy 
(Blackburn 2010: 3). Though illegal slavery and various forms of labour servi-
tude persist, there is some reason to suggest that with the revolution in fossil 
fuel energy and the mass introduction of machines, space could be opened up 
for slavery’s abolition (Bales 2012; Mouhot 2011; Nikiforuk 2012). Though 
there were precursors, a comprehensive treaty to ban the international slave 
trade was not realized until 1890 and it was only in 1926 when a ban on 
slavery itself was initiated. But the interconnections between the apparatus 
of violence used to capture and socially reproduce “New World” slavery and 
the wealth and unequal power of the European-led world order it helped cre-
ate and recreate is also mirrored in the present global energy order of fossil 
fuels—with oil by far the most important of the three majors.
Fossil fuels have always been connected with international violence and 
imperial power and can be traced to the rise of the first military-industrial 
complexes in the USA and Europe. By the 20th century, the two powers that 
created the most powerful means of destruction on earth—the USA and Soviet 
Union—were both awash in domestic oil. While there is much to say about 
this, we must restrict ourselves to a few comments here. The first comment is 
to realize that after World War I, the first mechanized or total war, virtually 
all military and governing officials realized that oil was essential to “modern 
warfare and industrial life” (Lewis 1921: 357; Yergin 1991). Difficulties in 
obtaining oil meant certain defeat as was also reinforced in the slaughter of 
World War II when Germany and Japan’s quest for oil faltered and the Allies 
drifted to victory on a sea of US oil (Friedrichs 2010; Hayward 1995). The 
second comment is that while the Soviet Union enlarged its sphere of influ-
ence after World War II and used its domestic oil to industrialize, build up its 
means of destruction and for strategic international purposes, it was the USA 
and the international oil companies that largely organized the international 
oil order. Many believe that this order is currently changing but I think it is 
safe to argue that the fount and matrix of the global oil order was and remains 
US military might and the US dollar, the numéraire for virtually all oil sales 
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not to mention other major commodities (de Graaff 2012). However, oil is 
not like any other commodity. As the war veteran Stan Goff argued: “Oil 
is not a normal commodity. No other commodity has five US navy battle 
groups patrolling the sea lanes to secure it” (cited in Clark 2005: 33). But 
while the US armed forces may be conceived as a global protection racket for 
“US” interests, from the capital as power perspective, we move away from 
methodological nationalism and consider how energy conflicts may actually 
benefit particular groups while causing great harm to many. From a critical 
political economy perspective, Nitzan and Bichler (1995, 2002, 2006; see 
also Bichler and Nitzan 2004, 2014) have done the most to shed light on 
how energy conflicts relate to the differential profitability of the leading oil 
firms. Readers are strongly encouraged to consult their works as I can only 
highlight one of their most important insights here: the fact that—with only 
one exception—every time that the differential earnings of the leading oil and 
gas companies trailed the average returns of the Fortune 500 companies, there 
were subsequent conflicts in the Middle East that restored the differential 
profitability of the oil and gas majors.5 Readers can consider for themselves 
whether this relationship is merely a coincidence or a pattern based on the 
oil and gas companies using their power and influence to shape government 
policy and encourage conflict to boost their earnings. While we may never 
know for certain without greater investigation, there can be little doubt that 
the relationship exists. A quick glance at Figure 14.5 already suggests that 
the “war on terror” was immensely profitable for the oil and gas industry as a 
whole. Figure 14.7 shows the increase in overall capitalization of the oil and 
gas industry listed on the FT Global 500 from the start of the “war on terror” 
and charts this with the yearly share price of ExxonMobil and Chevron, the 
two US oil and gas majors. ExxonMobil’s capitalization increased by 136% 
while Chevron trailed a bit behind at 122%. Not a bad return for the domi-
nant owners invested in oil and gas throughout the “war on terror” when we 
consider that the S&P 500 index provided only a 7% return to investors over 
the course of the war. There is little question that more spade work must be 
done to investigate the links between violence in the Middle East and US 
Grand Strategy as it pertains to energy and the future of world order. There is 
also much work to be done on the shifting global energy order and how this 
is connected to differential accumulation. And while analysis must go deeper 
into the politics and institutional power of the men (and they are typically 
5 Whilst there were no major Middle Eastern conflicts in 1996, the US did launch a series of cruise missile 
strikes during the Kurdish Civil War that year in northern Iraq.
[AU13]
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men) who seek to shape and reshape the world by monetizing oil and arm, 
a strong starting point is to focus on the battle for differential accumulation.
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